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THE RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION: WASTE
MANAGEMENT AND THE S&L CRISIS
INTRODUCTION
Throughout its history, the savings and loan industry has dedicated
itself almost exclusively "to promoting home ownership through mort-
gage lending."' By 1989, however, the industry was brought to a near
collapse due to fundamental flaws in the system's structure, changing
economic conditions, deregulation and fraud. Congress and the Bush
Administration responded by formulating and enacting a massive indus-
try bailout bill, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and En-
forcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA").2 The primary purposes of
FIRREA are to provide affordable mortgages and housing opportunities
by enhancing federal housing credit programs and resources; to create
the agencies and procedures to fund the resolution of failed thrift cases
and dispose of their assets; to reinforce the barriers between the regula-
tory and insurance functions of the thrift industry; to establish more
stringent capital requirements for thrifts; and to enhance regulation and
enforcement of the savings institutions regulatory agencies to protect
against waste, fraud and insider abuse.3
This Note provides a detailed look at the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion ("RTC"), which was established to "contain, manage, and resolve
failed savings associations."4 Part I explores the history of the savings
and loan ("S&L") crisis. Part II sets forth the basic structure and duties
of the RTC. Part III describes how the RTC obtains and uses its funding
and explains the role of the Resolution Funding Corporation
("REFCORP"). Part IV examines the programs implemented by the
RTC to resolve failed S&Ls, including an in-depth discussion of its asset
disposition policies, with particular attention paid to real estate and se-
curities. Lastly, Part V analyzes relevant case law influencing the RTC's
mission. This Part concentrates on the doctrine that gives the RTC au-
thority to recover on certain loans it acquires from failed S&Ls, even
where those loans were voidable because they were fraudulently made by
the S&Ls. In addition, it discusses a venue provision in FIRREA that is
having a large impact on the litigation in which the RTC is involved.
Finally, Part V focuses on a decision that grants the RTC the power to
supercede state bank branching laws and analyzes its effect on future
litigation.
1. See H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 291, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 86 [hereinafter House Banking Committee Report].
2. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (to be codified in various sections of 12
& 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FIRREA].
3. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 101, 103 Stat. at 187 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811); House Banking Committee Report, supra note 1, at 307-08, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at, 103-4.
4. FIRREA, supra note 2, § 101(7), 103 Stat. at 187 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811).
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I. HISTORY OF THE S&L INDUSTRY AND CRISIS
The thrift industry was created to enable American families to buy
homes with affordable financing.5 The industry was severely disabled,
however, in the 1930s by the Great Depression when borrowers could no
longer pay their mortgages, thus causing thousands of thrifts to fail.'
Anxious depositors withdrew their money from the system, accelerating
its collapse.' Congress passed a blitz of legislation to restore confidence
in the nation's financial systems, and created the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC").' Congress intended the FSLIC
to insure small depositors, "thus encouraging the public to reinvest their
funds in savings and loans." 9
Skyrocketing interest rates and record inflation during the late 1970s
and early 1980s led the Federal Reserve to institute a policy of control-
ling growth in the money supply.10 Subsequently, the cost of money to
thrifts dramatically increased, while their assets were still locked into
long-term, low-yield, fixed-rate mortgages."1 Congress and several state
legislatures responded by enacting legislation which was intended to en-
able the thrift industry to remain viable and competitive. 2
In 1980, Congress phased out regulations that capped the interest rates
thrifts could pay depositors.13 Thrifts were then able to compete with
other financial service providers by paying higher interest rates to deposi-
tors.1" Regulations, however, still prohibited them from making similar
adjustments in their mortgage and asset portfolios.' Thus, by 1981,
thrifts were paying an average of eleven percent for funds while their
5. See Villains of the S&L Crisis, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 1, 1990, at 53, 54.
For a complete history of the savings and loan industry and its regulations, see Note, Too
Many Consonants and Not Enough Consonance: The Development of the S&L Regulatory
Framework, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis:
Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S263 (1991).
6. See House Banking Committee Report, supra note 1, at 292, reprinted in U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 88.
7. See P.Z. Pilzer, Other People's Money: The Inside Story of the S&L Mess 32
(1989).
8. See National Housing Act of 1934, Ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended 12
U.S.C. §§ 1707 - 1730).
9. See House Banking Committee Report, supra note 1, at 293, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 89.
10. See id. at 294-95, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 90-1.
11. See id. at 295, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 91.
12. See id. at 294, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 90.
13. See id. at 295, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 91.
14. See id. at 296, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 92. Imme-
diately before the phase-out of these regulations, depositors withdrew their funds from
S&Ls in order to invest in money-market accounts offered by banks and brokerage houses
that paid higher interest rates. See Note, Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, in
Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and
Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S301, S307-08 (1991). Raising the interest-rate cap
on S&Ls enabled them to remain attractive to these depositors. See Villains of the S&L
Crisis, supra note 5, at 54.
15. See id.
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mortgage portfolios were earning only ten percent.1 6
In 1982, President Reagan signed into law the Garn-St Germain De-
pository Institutions Act,'7 which substantially deregulated the financial
services industry. The Act authorized thrifts to invest in a host of non-
real estate assets, including corporate debt securities, commercial loans,
and brokered deposits,'" enabling the thrifts to increase earnings on as-
sets and remain competitive.' 9 "[A] number of thrift managers [how-
ever] did not have the expertise needed to utilize these new powers, and
as a whole the industry had great difficulty in exercising its newfound
powers in a safe and sound manner."' As the number of thrift insolven-
cies began to increase, the foundation for the current S&L crisis was
laid.2'
Regulatory gimmicks masking the capital levels of the thrifts further
contributed to the crisis by enabling thrifts to avoid technical insolvency
and thus avert seizure by the FSLIC.' Because capital provides the
cushion to absorb losses, the accounting gimmicks created the illusion
that these undercapitalized thrifts were healthy.23 Mismanagement and
fraud also caused S&L failures.24 Indeed, the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion later found that forty percent of failures could be attributed to
fraud.25
These factors increased the number of S&L failures, overwhelming the
FSLIC,26 which by this time insured depositors up to $100,000 on their
accounts.27 By the end of 1988, the General Accounting Office, Con-
gress' investigatory agency, estimated that the FSLIC was insolvent by at
16. See House Banking Committee, supra note 1, at 296, reprinted in U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News, at 92.
17. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in various sections of 12 & 15
U.S.C.).
18. For a complete overview of the causes of the crisis in the S&L industry, see Note,
Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and
Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L Rev. S301
(1991).
19. Brokerage houses and other financial institutions package their funds for deposit
in the S&Ls, providing needed cash. For the brokerage house, placing the funds in the
S&L provides a safe, no-risk (the deposits are federally insured), high-yielding invest-
ment. See Villains of the S&L Crisis, supra note 5, at 55.
20. See P.Z. Pilzer, supra note 7, at 142.
21. House Banking Committee Report, supra note 1, at 297, reprinted in 1989 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 93.
22. See id. at 298, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 94.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 299-300, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 95-96.
25. See S.& L Report Cites Crime, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1990, at D2, col. 4. This
figure has been disputed by many. See Green, After the Falk The Criminal Law Enforce-
ment Response to the S&L Crisis, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regula-
tion, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S155, S163-68
(1991) (arguing that estimates of fraud may be questionable).
26. See House Banking Committee Report, supra note I, at 304, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 100.
27. See id. at 299, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 95.
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least $56 billion, almost four times greater than its insolvency at the end
of 1987.28
Low depositor confidence in the savings and loan industry (demon-
strated by record deposit outflows), the need to combat fraud and abuse,
and the severe insolvency of the FSLIC, made the need for a resolution
imperative.29 Attempting to salvage the thrift industry, President Bush
offered a plan in February 1989 that was introduced to Congress as the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
("FIRREA"). Congress approved the plan, and on August 9, 1989,
FIRREA became law.3 0
II. BASIC STRUCTURE AND DUTIES OF THE RTC
"Virtually overnight [with the passage of FIRREA and the establish-
ment of the RTC], the administration and Congress ... set in place an
organization, with assets twice that of the largest bank in the Nation. '31
Congress designed the RTC with the goals of (1) resolving cases involv-
ing FSLIC-insured institutions placed in conservatorship or receiver-
ship32 between January 1, 1989 and August 9, 1992; (2) liquidating the
Federal Asset Disposition Association ("FADA");3 3 and (3) conducting
28. See id. at 304, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 100.
29. See id. at 305, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 101.
30. For a complete discussion of the background and legislative history of FIRREA,
see Note, Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned: Statutory Overview of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, in Annual Survey of Finan-
cial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Ford-
ham L. Rev. S323 (1991).
31. Status and Activities of the RTC and the Oversight Board: Hearings before the
Subcomrn. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance and the Reso-
lution Trust Corporation Task Force of the House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban
Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1989)(statement of Rep. Bruce F. Vento (D-Minn),
Chairman of RTC Task Force).
32. A conservator is charged with protecting the assets of a troubled S&L while a
permanent solution to the institution's financial problems are worked out. See Barron's
Dictionary of Banking Terms 142 (1990). The S&L operates as normally as possible
under different management (for our purposes, the FSLIC or RTC). An S&L declared to
be insolvent is placed into receivership and its assets are sold. See id. Essentially, the
institution no longer functions as a going concern.
33. FADA was chartered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB") in
November of 1985. See House Banking Committee Report, supra note 1, at 302, reprinted
in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 98. It was designed to assist the FSLIC by
bringing in a group of experts to help manage the growing number of assets coming under
FSLIC control through seizure of insolvent thrifts. See id. Congressional investigation
however, discovered that FADA was managed poorly, with no clear mandate and rife
with conflicts of interest. See Federal Asset Disposition Association, Hearing before the
Subcomm. of Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 37 (1987)(state-
ment of Rep. Fernand St Germain, Chairman of the subcommittee). The General Ac-
counting Office ("GAO") found that FADA was losing money and had not demonstrated
that it could dispose of property any more efficiently than the FSLIC. See id. Despite a
bipartisan call from the House Banking Committee to terminate FADA, the Bank Board
refused. See House Banking Committee Report, supra note 1, at 302, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 98.
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operations in order to maximize recovery on acquired assets, minimizing
the impact on local markets, making efficient use of funds, minimizing
losses incurred in resolving cases, and preserving a supply of affordable
housing.' Congress also mandated that the RTC review certain costly
deals that the FSLIC made with investment specialists between January
1, 1988 and August 9, 1989, and "exercise any and all legal rights to
modify, renegotiate, or restructure such agreements where savings would
be realized."35
The RTC was established as a mixed-ownership government corpora-
tion36 with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") as its
manager.37 In order to ensure that the RTC was operating with the
broadest policy mandate, FIRREA created an Oversight Board to super-
vise and answer for the RTC.38 Members of the Oversight Board include
the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, and two independent members. 39 The Board's primary responsi-
34. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(3)(C), 103 Stat. at 369-70 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 222, 101st ong., 1st Sess. 393-411,
reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 432, 450 [hereinafter Conference
Report].
35. FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(11)(B), 103 Stat. at 373 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(11)(B)). In 1988 and early 1989, the FSLIC and the FHLBB resolved
199 insolvent thrifts. See GAO Releases Report on Controversial 1988 Thrift Resolutions
by Bank Board, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 482 (Sept. 24, 1990). The purchaser
was provided long-term financial assistance in 96 of these transactions. See id Because
the FSLIC was bankrupt when it negotiated these deals, it issued promissory notes, with
the interest payable to the thrift instead of providing cash assistance to the investors
acquiring the insolvent S&Ls. See Agency Sees Way to Cut Bailout Costs, LA. Tunes,
Sept. 19, 1990, at D4, col. 4. The FSLIC also guaranteed profits on assets and provided
with tax breaks. See id
These deals were highly criticized, not only because of the cost, but because the benefi-
ciaries of these deals were some of the wealthiest people in the country. See Hill Quietly
Approves S&L Funds, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1990, at Cl, coL 6. The RTC issued a report
on these deals on Sept. 18, 1990, which concluded that "the 1988 Agreements were a
high-cost method of taking over insolvent thrifts, and thus billions can be saved by exer-
cising options in these contracts." RTC Report on FSLIC's 1988-89 Assistance Agree-
ments: Hearing of the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (Sept. 20, 1990) (statement of L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC).
The report also determined that it would be cheaper for the government to borrow the
funds to pay off the investors in the short term, rather than make yearly subsidy and
interest payments. See Hill Quietly Approves S&L Funds, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1990, at
C8, col. 1. Congress thus authorized $22 billion to help the RTC realize such savings.
See id.
36. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(2), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(2)).
37. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(1)(C), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(1)(C)). The FDIC's Board of Directors is the Board of Directors for
the RTC; the Chairman of the FDIC acts as chairman of the RTC. See Conference Re-
port, supra note 34, at 411, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 450.
38. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 364 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(a)(2)).
39. See id. § 501(a)(3)(A), 103 Stat. at 364 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(a)(3)(A)).
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bility is developing overall strategies for case resolution, asset disposition,
and financing.'
The RTC will dissolve by December 31, 1996.41 If at that time it is
still acting as conservator or receiver for an institution, the FDIC will
assume the RTC's responsibilities.42 Any assets or liabilities of the RTC
at that time will'be transferred to the FSLIC Resolution Fund.43
III. REFCORP AND RTC FINANCING
The RTC requires funds for two distinct purposes: to pay depositors
at failed thrifts the amount of their insured accounts and to provide
working capital to finance acquired assets until they are sold.44 The
REFCORP was established to provide the RTC with funds to pay depos-
itors.45 REFCORP is managed by a Directorate consisting of the Direc-
tor of the Office of Finance of the Federal Home Loan Banks, as well as
the Presidents of two Federal Home Loan Banks selected by the Over-
sight Board.46
FIRREA authorizes REFCORP to issue $50 billion in long-term se-
curities47 which the RTC will use to pay insured depositors at failed
thrifts.48 The principal on these securities will be paid from the proceeds
of long-term government securities that REFCORP purchased with
money contributed by the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks.49 Interest
will be paid from proceeds the RTC earns in resolving failed thrifts,50
from contributions by Federal Home Loan Banks,51 and from the United
States Treasury.- 2
FIRREA also authorizes the RTC to borrow funds from the United
40. See id. § 501(a)(6)(A)(i), 103 Stat. at 365 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(a)(6)(A)(i)).
41. See id. § 501(o)(1), 103 Stat. at 391 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(o)(1)).
42. See id.
43. Id. § 501(o)(2), 103 Stat. at 391 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(o)(2)).
44. See Funding the Resolution Trust Corporation: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 160 (1990) (statement of
L. William Seidman, Chairman, FDIC and RTC) [hereinafter RTC Hearing].
45. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 51 l(a), 103 Stat. at 394 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441b(a)).
46. See id. § 511(c)(1), 103 Stat. at 395 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441b(c)(1)).
47. See Conference Report, supra note 1, at 414, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News, at 453.
48. See RTC Hearing, supra note 44, at 10 (statement of L. William Seidman, Chair-
man, FDIC and RTC).
49. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 511(f)(3), 103 Stat. at 402 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441b(f)(3)); Problems of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation:
Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess., 23-24 (1989) (statement of Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury).
50. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 511(f)(2)(B), 103 Stat. at 401 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441b(f)(2)(B)).
51. See id. § 511(f)(2)(C), 103 Stat. at 401 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441b(f)(2)(C)).
52. See id. § 51 1(f)(2)(E), 103 Stat. at 401-2 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441b(f)(2)(E)).
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States Treasury and issue notes to obtain its working capital.5 3 The total
amount of these notes and obligations is limited, however, by a specific
formula.' Under this formula, the sum of the contributions the RTC
receives from REFCORP, plus its outstanding obligations, may not ex-
ceed the RTC's available cash, plus eighty-five percent of the fair market
value of its other assets, by more than $50 billion.-" While this mandated
cap on borrowing provides the RTC with a capital cushion, in order to
use the full $50 billion in REFCORP funding the RTC must slow down
resolutions and disbursements to depositors to coincide with the sale of
acquired assets in order.56
IV. RESOLUTION OF FAILED THRIFrs
The RTC is the successor-in-interest to the FSLIC for all thrifts placed
into conservatorship or receivership between January 1, 1989 and August
9, 1992.11 It also manages and resolves new cases placed into conserva-
torship by the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"). 5 8
A. The Resolution Process
The RTC resolves failed thrifts in three ways. The first is liquidation
of the S&L's assets, the proceeds of which are used to pay depositors of
the insolvent institution up to the amount of their FSLIC-insured depos-
its.59 The second is through merger, consolidation, or reorganization;
the entire thrift, including all its assets and liabilities are purchased or
merged into an existing thrift.' Finally, the thrift may be sold or dis-
mantled: the deposits are sold to other S&Ls or banks rather than liqui-
53. See id. § 501(i), 103 Stat. at 384 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(i)).
54. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501O)(1), 103 Stat. at 384 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(j)(1)).
55. See id; Conference Report, supra note 34, at 414, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, at 453; RTC Complied Vith FIRREA Limits on Outstanding
Obligations GAO Says, 55 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 382 (Sept. 10, 1990).
56. See RTCHearing, supra note 44, at I1 (statement of L. William Seidman, Chair-
man, FDIC and RTC).
57. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(6), 103 Stat. at 370 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(6)). Thrifts placed into conservatorship prior to January 1, 1989 are
handled by the FDIC through the FSLIC Resolution Fund. See Note, The FDIC's En-
hanced Powers Over Savings Associations: Does FIRREA Make It '"SAIF'7, in Annual
Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfigura-
tion, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S381, S387 & n.47 (1991).
58. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(3)(A), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 144la(b)(3)(A)). For a full description of OTS and its functions, see Note, The
Office of Thrift Supervision, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation,
The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S363 (1991).
59. See Hearing on the Semiannual Report of the Resolution Trust Corporation-1990:
Hearing of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2nd
Sess. 17 (May 23, 1990) (Statement of Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury).
Through liquidation, RTC acquires a thrift's assets, which it in turn tries to sell. See
infra notes 78-134 and accompanying text.
60. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(11)(A)iii)-(iv), 103 Stat. at 372-3 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 144la(b)(11)(A)('ii)-(iv)).
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dated, and the assets are marketed and sold.61 Regardless of the
resolution method, the RTC must find some way to dispose of the thrifts'
component assets and liabilities.62
With a mandate to maximize "the net present value return from the
sale or other disposition of [seized thrifts], 63 the RTC is subject to com-
peting pressures: to resolve cases as quickly as possible to save the costs
of managing the thrifts and their assets, and to find the highest realizable
value in their sale. However, because thrifts can lose value while they are
under RTC control, the RTC risks being caught in a Catch-22 situation:
the longer it waits for the best deal to materialize, the lower the ultimate
price it may recover. One commentator noted that " '[s]eized thrifts are
like fresh fruit. They rot very quickly the longer they sit on the shelf.' "6
There are two factors that cause thrifts to lose value. First, a decrease
in a thrift's core deposit base immediately reduces the amount that the
RTC can realize from a sale. Core deposit runoff often occurs because
depositors at a thrift move their funds elsewhere. 65 The deposits of a
thrift are normally purchased by another institution at a one to six per-
cent premium. 66 Thus, if the core deposits at an S&L decrease by $1
billion, and the purchaser was willing to pay three percent for the depos-
its, the RTC would receive $30 million less for the deposits than if the
runoff had not occurred. Second, when a thrift is not making new loans,
new assets are not being generated, and thus, the value of the thrift de-
creases.67 "The asset side atrophies and it takes a long time to regenerate
.*..."68 After an inactive period, the problem is exacerbated by difficul-
ties in rebuilding relationships with realtors, who are a valuable source of
new mortgage customers. A shrinking asset base with little hope for re-
covery does not leave the RTC in a position to attract bidders.
To avoid a loss in value of seized thrifts, the RTC instituted the Accel-
61. For a discussion of asset disposition, see infra notes 78-134 and accompanying
text.
62. In analyzing the resolution process it is important to realize that a thrift's balance
sheet is the reverse of a corporation's balance sheet. Assets are made up of the thrift's
loan portfolio, as well as other tangibles such as real estate. See R. Thorn, Introduction
to Money and Banking, at 36-37 (1976); Banking Terminology (A.B.A.), at 19 (1989).
Deposits in the thrift are liabilities. See Thorn, supra at 52-55; Banking Terminology,
supra at 109, 209.
63. FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(3)(C)(i), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(i)).
64. How One S&L Lost Value Under the RTC, Am. Banker, June 4, 1990, at 1, col. I.
65. One thrift, Gibraltar Savings of Simi Valley, California, lost about one-third of its
deposits from the time it was seized on March 31, 1989, until December 31, 1989. See
How One S&L Lost Value Under the RTC, supra note 64, at 16, col. 3.
66. See id. at 16, col. 4. The purchaser pays the premium in the hope that customers
will keep their funds in the accounts, thus attracting other customers. See Bailout Agency
Races to Sell Insolvent S&Ls, Investor's Daily, June 8, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
67. See How One S&L Lost Value Under the RTC, supra note 64, at 16, col 5.
68. Id.
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erated Resolution Program C'ARP").6 9 The program is designed to in-
crease the price recovered by the RTC for seized thrifts and minimize the
costs to the taxpayers.70 Under the ARP, the RTC markets a failing
thrift71 for sale before it is actually placed in conservatorship.' All of
the assets are transferred to the purchaser or sold to another buyer before
the thrift passes through receivership into the new owner's control."
The program allows the RTC to search for a buyer "while [the thrift]
still ha[s] a somewhat attractive core deposit base, and before any stigma
associated with the conservatorship program can be attached to
[it] .... ,74 The first round of sales under the ARP was completed the
end of 19907 with seemingly positive results. Deposit runoff has been
greatly reduced, and there are many qualified buyers for the thrifts. 6
The ARP appears to be the most effective approach to enable the RTC
to sell insolvent thrifts. While the RTC has the authority to sell a thrift
in conservatorship or receivership, the thrifts in the ARP have not yet
been placed under the RTC's control. Whether the RTC and OTS are
acting within the law in lining up a purchaser for a thrift while that thrift
is still under its own management is still open for debate. Other litiga-
tion involving the RTC, however, has already demonstrated that the
courts are ready to give the RTC very wide latitude in interpreting its
powers under FIRREA."
B. Asset Disposition
When a thrift is placed in conservatorship or receivership, the RTC
acquires and assumes control over all of the thrift's assets. FIRREA
directs the RTC to maximize the return from the sale and disposition of
these assets. 71 The assets acquired from the seized thrifts include a wide
69. See Statement of Policy on Accelerated Resolution Program, 55 Fed. Reg. 37,380(1990).
70. See id.
71. The OTS must find that the thrift is "in danger of failing and possess[es] the
financial characteristics that would cause it to be placed in RTC conservatorship within
one year." Id.
72. See id
73. See OTS Vill Hasten Transfer of Sick Thrifts to Strapped RTC, Am. Banker,
Nov. 14, 1990, at 5, cols. 2-3. This receivership period is a mere formality as control is
given to the RTC and turned over to new owners in the same day. See id.
74. Disposition of Assets by the Resolution Trust Corporation: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Financial Institution Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, RTC Task Force
of the House Comm on Banking Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 12
(March 27, 1990) (Statement of William Roelle, Director, Resolutions and Operations
Division, RTC) [hereinafter Asset Disposition Hearing].
75. See OTS Will Hasten Transfer of Sick Thrifts to Strapped RTC, supra note 73, at
5, col. 4.
76. See id. at col. 5.
77. For a further discussion of this litigation, see infra notes 135-192 and accompany-
ing text.
78. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(3)(C)(i), 103 Stat. at 369 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)Ci)).
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variety of investments normally made by an S&L, the largest percentage
being in real estate and securities.
1. Real Estate Disposition
FIRREA mandated that the RTC establish a Real Estate Asset Divi-
sion ("READ") to manage the disposition and sale of its real estate hold-
ings." READ is charged with regularly publishing the RTC's properties
and identifying those properties with "natural, cultural, recreational or
scientific values of special significance."80 Typical real estate holdings
consist of single-family homes, condominium developments, office build-
ings, apartments and commercial lots, as well as agricultural, mining and
unimproved land. 1 These assets must be sold at the highest possible
price, in a manner that minimizes the impact on local real estate markets
and that maximizes the availability of affordable housing for low- and
moderate-income individuals. 2
To accomplish this goal, FIRREA authorizes the RTC to utilize the
private sector in the sale of assets where "practical and efficient." 83 Us-
ing local expertise, Congress reasoned, would ensure greater market sta-
bility because local realtors can better gauge the appropriate number of
properties to sell at any given time." The RTC currently enlists local
real estate brokers to list properties and publishes its holdings for public
inspection to facilitate sales." Its goal is to simplify purchasing
procedures.8 6
To determine the market value of the real estate assets it sells, FIR-
REA authorizes the RTC to establish an appraisal or other valuation
79. FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(12)(F), 103 Stat. at 375 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(12)(F)).
80. See id. This additional responsibility to "tag" certain properties has been criti-
cized. See Resolution Trust Corporation Task Force Natural Cultural and Recreational
Resource Policy as it Relates to the Disposition of Assets by the RTC: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Resolution
Trust Task Force of the House Comm. on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st
Cong., 2nd Sess. 17-18 (Sept. 7, 1990) (statement of Rep. Parris). Estimates are that
three to five percent of the properties have been identified as having "significant value,"
but that ninety percent of these are beachfront condominiums. See id. at 3, 15. Repre-
sentative Stan Parris (R-Va.), the ranking minority member of the Task Force, criticized
the RTC for delaying the sale of thousands of properties while they are inspected for
"significant value" without making a determination of their marketability. See id.
81. See How U.S. Is Easing Realty Sale, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1990, at D6, cols. 3-4
(see table).
82. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(3)(C)(i), (ii), and (v), 103 Stat. at 369-370 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(i), (ii) and (v)).
83. FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(11)(A)(ii), 103 Stat. at 372 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(11)(A)(ii)).
84. See House Banking Committee Report, supra note 1, at 441, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 237.
85. See How U.S. Is Easing Realty Sale, supra note 81, at D6, col. 2.
86. "The aim is to make buying... as easy as walking into the local real estate broker
and agreeing to a contract on the house down the street." Id. at D1, col. 3.
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method. 7 FIRREA also required that the RTC prescribe "appropriate
standards" for the performance of real estate appraisals, 8 since extensive
Congressional studies had found that fraudulent real estate appraisals
were used by "unscrupulous thrift management."8 9 Congress intended
that the RTC look for the fair value of these assets; in other words, the
price that reasonably might be expected in a current sale on an open
market, not the price received in a forced or liquidation sale.'
The RTC requires an appraisal for all real estate transactions valued at
over $50,000. These include sales, purchases or leases of real property,
and use of real property as security for a lease.91 The appraisal provides
an objective and realistic opinion of market value, which helps the RTC
determine a selling price for seized property. 92
The RTC's reliance on appraisals, however, has been criticized for
hampering the pace of sales because appraisals can overstate the value of
the property.93 Appraisers tend to be overly cautious and conservative in
their appraisals of RTC assets. 4 An appraiser may overvalue a property
in an attempt to avoid a situation where the RTC sells the property for
the appraised value and then the purchaser resells the property for a sub-
stantial profit.95 Inflated appraisal prices, therefore, hamper the RTC's
sales efforts.
Appraisals are based on past sales, current revenues, market condi-
tions and trends, and replacement costs. 96 These standards, however,
may not reflect a realistic appraisal price in the markets where the RTC
operates. There are few current sales, little income potential because of
high vacancies, and replacement costs are not measurable where there is
little or no ongoing building development. 97
Responding to slow sales, and possibly acknowledging that its ap-
praisal prices were too high, the RTC instituted a markdown policy on
87. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(12)(D)(ii), 103 Stat. at 374 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(12)(D)(ii)).
88. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 1110, 103 Stat. at 514 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 3339). The provisions of this title are intended "to protect Federal financial and policy
interests" in real estate related financial transactions. House Banking Committee Report,
supra note 1, at 478, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 274.
89. See House Banking Committee Report, supra note 1, at 311, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 107.
90. See House Banking Committee Report, supra note 1, at 441, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 237.
91. See 12 C.F.R- §§ 1608.2, 1608.3.
92. See 55 Fed. Reg. 22,423 (1990).
93. See Keogh, Well-Meant Regulations May Thwart RTC Mission, Am. Banker,
June 19, 1990, at 4, cols. 2-3.
94. See Transactions to Resolve Failed Depository Institutions: Hearing of the House
Comm. on Banking; Finance and Urban Affairs, 32 (Apr. 2, 1990) (Statement of William
Isaac, former head of the FDIC).
95. See id.
96. See 12 C.F.R. § 1608.4.
97. See Keogh, supra note 93 at col. 3; Heller, Letter to the Editor, Am. Banker, May
29, 1990, at 6, col. 3.
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its real estate assets. Properties unsold after six months are repriced at
fifteen percent below the original appraised value; if unsold after three
more months, the price is reduced an additional five percent.98 This
price-cutting policy led to concern about the effect on local real estate
markets, since the RTC's price-slashing places downward pressure on the
prices of other properties in the area. The RTC officials rationalized this
pressure by concluding that too many unsold properties on a market
causes it to be even more depressed.9 9 RTC officials also reasoned that
failure to sell property increases costs to the RTC by as much as twenty
percent a year.10°
This new markdown policy appears to contradict FIRREA's mandate
that the RTC avoid selling property in depressed areas for less than
ninety-five percent of market value."10 The RTC officials countered stat-
ing that appraisals, reviews, brokers' opinions, market analyses and eval-
uations based on offers received and comparable sales are factors which
will supplement appraisals in determining market value."02
In addition to its new markdown policy, the RTC began selling some
of its real estate holdings by auction in 1990.103 If marketed properly,
auctions can expose properties to many purchasers, thus increasing the
opportunity to maximize the realizable amount for the property.
1°4
Builders and real estate experts encouraged the RTC's use of auctions
because they establish a more accurate price gauge which correlates bet-
ter to market conditions than do appraisals.'0 5
Because of FIRREA's stringent standards for minimum selling
prices, 1°6 the RTC formulated rigid guidelines for the auctioning pro-
cess.107 Property may be sold "absolute," without a minimum price,
only if its market value is below $100,000 and if it was widely exposed to
the market. 08 Property valued at over $100,000 can be sold at an auc-
tion with a minimum price no less than seventy percent of appraised
value."° This standard was set because the RTC believed that a higher
minimum price standard would discourage participation and reduce the
98. See 55 Fed. Reg. 22,423, 22,424 (1990); Savings Bailout Agency to Allow Large
Cuts in Prices of Real Estate, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
99. See id. at D5, col. 2.
100. See id.
101. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(12)(D)(ii), 103 Stat. at 374 (to be codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(12)(D)(ii)).
102. See 55 Fed. Reg. 22423 (1990); RTC Mulls Plan To Sell Property At Big Dis-
counts, Wall St. J., Apr. 25, 1990, at A16, col. 4.
103. See 55 Fed. Reg. 22,424 (1990).
104. See L
105. See Praise and Doubts on U.S. Sale Plan, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1990, at D14, col.
4.
106. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
107. See 55 Fed. Reg. 22,424 (1990).
108. See id.
109. See id
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aggregate net present value on the property. 110 Property eligible for the
Affordable Housing Program, 11 however, may never be sold at an auc-
tion. Lastly, the RTC may reject any offers made in an environment of
non-competitive bidding.
Despite the detailed regulations the RTC's auction program got off to
an inauspicious start. The RTC planned to auction off up to $300 million
worth of property during the fall of 1990, 211 but the auction was canceled
when the company hired to run the auction failed to meet its security
obligations for the auction. This incident generated skepticism about the
RTC's methods in selecting and dealing with private contractors. 3
a. Affordable Housing Disposition
Although the S&L industry has always promoted home ownership, 4
it neglected this goal in the deregulation of the 1980s. FIRREA sought
to resuscitate this goal by directing the RTC to "foster home ownership
opportunities for low- and moderate-income individuals in those cases
where it is prudent and reasonable to expect that suitable repossessed
homes will not be readily sold at market prices.""' 5 Because the portfo-
lios of many insolvent thrifts contain housing units that Congress wanted
to make available to working class families, 1 6 FIRREA outlined de-
tailed procedures for the sale of these units. 1 '
Property to be set aside for low- and moderate-income families is
termed "eligible residential property" and defined by a formula spelled
out in the National Housing Act.'" When the RTC acquires property
110. See id.
111. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
112. See How US: Is Easing Realty Sale, supra note 81, at D6, coL 2- All Eyes Are on
Auctioneer Hired by RTC and He Loves It, Banking Week, June 4, 1990, at 2, coL 1.
113. See RTC's Satellite Auction Stays on the Launch Pad, Am. Banker, Sept. 19, 1990,
at 1, col. 4. The auction company admitted that it had not met its obligations, but de-
fended its actions by saying that the RTC had pulled some of the more attractive proper-
ties off the auction block, causing several investors to withdraw. The RTC was fully
within its contractual powers to remove these properties, however. While the auction
company's defense appears to be self-serving, the episode indicates some indecisiveness on
the part of the RTC. One commentator has said that it raises a "red flag" for companies
considering contracting with the RTC. See id. at 19, cols. 34 (statement of G. David
Fensterheim, Executive Director, Real Estate Capital Recovery Association, a trade
group for asset management companies).
114. See House Banking Committee Report, supra note 1, at 291, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 87.
115. See id., at 309, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 105.
116. See id. at 444, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 240.
117. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(c), 103 Stat. at 376 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1441a(c)); Affordable Housing Disposition Program, 55 Fed. Reg. 35,564, 35,565
(1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 1609) [hereinafter Affordable Housing Disposi-
tion Program]; Conference Report, supra note 34, at 416-20, reprinted in 1989 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News, at 455-59.
118. See FIRREA, supra note 2, §§ 501(c)(9)(D)(ii), 501(c)(9)(F)(ii), 103 Stat. at 380
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(c)(9)(D)(ii), 1441a(c)(9)(F)(ii)). Eligible multi-fam-
ily homes are defined at 12 U.S.C. 1715(1)(d)(3)(ti), and are currently valued at between
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that meets this formula, it gives qualifying households, public agencies
and non-profit organizations a ninety-day right of first refusal to
purchase the property.119 A minimum twenty percent of the units sold
during this ninety-day period is reserved for families whose income does
not exceed fifty percent of the median income of the area, and an addi-
tional fifteen percent of the units sold is reserved for families whose in-
come does not exceed eighty percent of the area's median income.120
FIRREA authorizes the RTC to provide financing for sales of eligible
property and to sell such property at below the net realizable market
value in order to achieve the lower income occupancy requirements. 12'
Interest on the RTC-financed mortgages provided to meet these require-
ments are also set at below market interest. 122 Through these statutory
provisions, Congress intends to promote affordable housing opportuni-
ties, and return the S&L industry to its original course and goals.
2. Securities and Loan Disposition
Although the RTC's real estate assets have received the most atten-
tion, they account for only thirty percent of the RTC's total assets. The
other seventy percent are in financial instruments.123  These include
mortgages on family and vacation homes, investment securities such as
stocks and bonds, mortgage-backed securities, construction and other
loans.124 Thus they cover the "hodgepodge" of investments a typical
S&L might make. 125
Marketable securities, like Treasury securities, mortgage-backed secur-
ities, stocks and bonds, are readily traded on the public market, much
more liquid than real estate and, therefore, easier to sell. These securities
do however, require the RTC to balance its sales carefully so that it
neither sells too many securities too quickly, which would disrupt the
capital markets, nor sells them too slowly, which would increase the
RTC's finance and handling costs.126
$28,032 and $58,392 per unit. See Conference Report, supra note 34, at 416, reprinted In
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 455. Eligible single-family units are defined at 12
U.S.C. 1709(b)(2), and are currently valued at less than $67,500. See id.
119. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(c)(2)(B), 103 Stat. at 376 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(c)(2)(B)); Conference Report, supra note 34, at 416, reprinted in 1989
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at 455-56; Affordable Housing Disposition Program,
supra note 117, at 35,566.
120. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(c)(3)(E), 103 Stat. at 377 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 144la(c)(3)(E)); Affordable Housing Disposition Program, supra note 117, at
35,569.
121. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(c)(6), 103 Stat. at 378 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(c)(6)).
122. See id.
123. See S&L Loans May Be Sold To Nomura, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1990, at Cl, col. 6,
ClI, col. 3.
124. See Bailout Aide's $130 Billion Burden, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1990, at DI, cols. 4-
5 (graph).
125. See id at D1, cols. 3-4.
126. See id. The RTC is also one of the country's largest holders of junk bonds. See
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Smaller assets, such as auto loans, individual mortgages, construction
and consumer loans, are more difficult to sell than marketable securities
because the costs associated with them are high.'27 The RTC developed
a plan to "securitize" these assets, grouping them together and issuing a
security backed by the package, which will create a securities-type mar-
ket for them.128 The desired result is to encourage banks and investment
houses to purchase these "securities" from the RTC and to offer them to
capital markets.1 29
Poor records and questionable collateral also make potential buyers
very wary of some assets. Consequently the RTC provides representa-
tions and warranties on many securities and assets. 3 ° The RTC repre-
sentations ensure against problems that might arise from inadequate
documentation.31 "If the documentation ... is very bad, [the RTC]
might as well sell it at the maximum price and have the buyer come back
to [the RTC] with any problems and then try to work them out later."' 32
Moreover, interested buyers can avoid costly "due diligence" prior to
bidding because of the representations and warranties. The due diligence
process of analyzing all of an S&L's assets and insuring that each is prop-
erly collateralized often discourages potential buyers.' 33 But with the
RTC's new provisions, due diligence can be done at the back end of a
sale. 134
V. RTC IN THE COURTS
The RTC, along with the FDIC, is estimated to be a party to some
110,000 lawsuits. 135 The government's legal tab exceeded $500 million in
1990.136 While most of the S&L suits are fairly small and routine, some
Wall St. J., June 7, 1990, at C19, col. 1. "There's no question that we have a substantial
percentage of the trading marketplace; there's no question that we have many securities
that do not actively trade." Thrift Asset Disposal Oversight, supra note 74, at I 1 (state-
ment of Elisabeth N. Spector, Director, Finance and Administration Division, RTC).
Selling these junk bonds can be more difficult than selling "investment-grade" securities,
because investors tend to shy away from them because of economic fears. See Failed-
S&L Junk Bond Sales Hit $900 Million, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1990, at D5, col. 1.
127. See Kormendi, Letter to the Editor, Am. Banker, June 19, 1990, at 5, col. 1.
128. See id; Bailout Aide's $130 Billion Burden, supra note 124, at DI, col 3.
129. See Bailout Aide's $130 Billion Burden, supra note 124, at Dl, cOL 3.
130. See id. at D6, col. 3.
131. See id.
132. Id. (quoting Elisabeth N. Spector, Director, Finance and Administration Divi-
sion, RTC).
133. When a thrift begins to feel the pressure of oncoming insolvency, its record-keep-
ing may falter. Indeed, the RTC acquires many loans that may not have complete or
accurate documentation. See Bailout Aide's $130 Billion Burden, supra note 124, at D6,
col. 3. Due diligence on a poorly documented loan would be very costly and might not be
worth the effort to many potential bidders.
134. See Thrift Asset Disposal Oversight. supra note 74, at 6 (statement of William Ro-
elle, Director, Resolutions and Operations Division, RTC).
135. See $500 Million Legal Tab, A.B.A. J., November 1990, at 30.
136. See id. at 29.
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are complex and involve millions of dollars.137 This Note will now ad-
dress some of the seminal cases involving the RTC, and will analyze the
implications of their holdings.
A. The D'Oench, Duhme Doctrine and Asset Recovery
Most of the litigation involving the RTC is an attempt to recover as-
sets of a failed S&L after the RTC has taken control. Many of these
assets were in the form of loans that were acquired through fraud.
Thrifts would make a profitable loan, for example, but not provide ade-
quate documentation, hiding the transaction from bank examiners or di-
rectors.138 Other loans were made to further schemes in which investors
were persuaded to borrow money from the thrift to invest in fraudulent
partnerships. 139 In another recurring scenario, an unscrupulous loan of-
ficer would have a customer sign a blank promissory note and keep the
money himself." On first impression it seems that the RTC would have
difficulty recovering because such loan agreements would be voidable. 4 ,
However, the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine, which evolved from the
Supreme Court's 1942 decision in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation,'42 has given the RTC tremendous power in
recovering the assets of failed S&Ls under its control.
In D'Oench, Duhme, the Supreme Court found "a federal policy to
protect [the FDIC], and the public funds which it administers, against
misrepresentations as to the securities or other assets in the portfolios of
the banks which [the FDIC] insures or to which it makes loans."' 143 The
Court stated that it was "irrelevant" whether the creditor was injured or
deceived, 144 holding that the notemaker could not escape liability based
on a secret arrangement between himself and the bank because such an
arrangement violates public policy. 145 The Court said
[t]he test is whether the note was designed to deceive the creditors or
the public authority, or would tend to have that effect. It would be
sufficient in this type of case that the maker lent himself to a scheme or
arrangement whereby the banking authority on which [the FDIC] re-
137. See id at 30.
138. See Government Says 'Tough Luck', Nat'l L. J., Sept. 24, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 3, col. 2.
141. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts §§ 9-13 (3d ed. 1987).
142. 315 U.S. 447 (1942). In that case, a bank obtained a promissory note from a
preferred client which enabled the bank's books to avoid reflecting a loss. There was an
understanding between the notemaker and the bank that the bank would not enforce the
note and that the interest paid would be remitted to the notemaker. The bank subse-
quently failed, and the FDIC, upon seizing the bank and its assets, attempted to collect
on the note. The notemaker contended he owed nothing because of his arrangement with
the bank. See id. at 449-50.
143. Id. at 457.
144. See id. at 459.
145. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 315 U.S. 447,
459 (1942).
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lied in insuring the bank was or was likely to be misled.'46
The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine was eventually codified at 12 U.S.C.
1832(e).147 This section reads:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the right, title or in-
terest of the [FDIC] in any asset acquired by it under this section,
either as security for a loan or by purchase, shall be valid against the
[FDIC] unless such agreement (1) shall be in writing, (2) shall have
been executed by the bank and the person or persons claiming an ad-
verse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously
with the acquisition of the asset by the bank, (3) shall have been ap-
proved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan committee,
which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or com-
mittee, and (4) shall have been, continuously, from the time of its exe-
cution, an official record of the bank.148
The underlying purpose of the section is to allow federal and state
bank examiners to rely on a bank's records in evaluating the worth of the
bank's assets.149 "[N]either fraud in the inducement nor knowledge by
the FDIC is relevant to the section's application."1 0
Courts have held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and § 1823(e)
preclude a number of defenses used by notemakers in refusing payment
to the government agency that had obtained the note. These include
fraudulent inducement,"' oral side agreement, 15 2 lack of considera-
146. Id. at 460.
147. See Vernon v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 907 F.2d 1101, 1105 (1 1th Cir.
1990); see also FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc. 766 F.2d 744, 753 (3rd Cir.
1985) ("reasonable inference that a purpose of [§ 1823(e)] was to codify the rule of
D'Oench, Duhme")
148. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1988).
149. See Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91 (1987).
150. Id. at 93.
151. See, eg., idL, 484 U.S. at 88-89 (1987) (misrepresentations by bank to borrowers
about the size and type of real property conveyed); FSLIC v. Lafayette, 855 F.2d 196,
197 (5th Cir. 1988) (misrepresentation by bank that borrower's liability would terminate
when certain loan documents were "completed" and delivered); FSLIC v. Murray, 853
F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1988) (no defense for borrowers who claimed they signed
blank notes with understanding they would be properly filled in by the bank); FDIC v.
Galloway, 856 F.2d 112, 115 (10th Cir. 1988) (bank's representation that borrower was
good credit risk offers guarantors no defense); FDIC v. McClanahan, 795 F.2d 512, 513
(5th Cir. 1986) (borrower signed blank note and amount filled in was much greater than
expected); FDIC v. Investors Assocs. X, Ltd., 775 F.2d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir. 1985) (no
defense where bank represented to borrower that the latter would not be personally liable
for the note and would never have to pay); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 877
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982) (no defense where bank represented that it
was in sound condition and would defer interest on the notes); RSR Properties, Inc. v.
FDIC, 706 F. Supp. 524, 531-32 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (no defense for representations by loan
officer that notes would be renewed on favorable terms when they became due); Dill v.
FSLIC, 678 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (no defense for representations by
bank that note would be repaid from commissions owed to bank and that defendant
would not be personally liable); FSLIC v. Hsi, 657 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D. La. 1986)
(no defense for representations by lender that it was solvent and notes would be rolled
over when due).
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tion153 and fraud. 154 FIRREA extended all of the provisions of Section
1823(e)' 55 to the RTC 56, and courts have applied relevant case law
under the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and Section 1823(e) to the RTC as
well. 57 The practical effect of this application is that the RTC will be
able to collect on a variety of loans and notes made by S&Ls even though
they may have been induced by fraud.
Extending the doctrine will also help the RTC in asset disposition.
The D'Oench, Duhme doctrine promotes purchase and assumption trans-
actions by insulating the purchaser of the assets protection from secret
agreements that may diminish the practical value of the acquired as-
sets.158 One court has said that
[e]xtending D'Oench, Duhme to transferees of assets from RTC...
provides RTC with greater opportunity to protect the failed institu-
tions' assets. Moreover, if the protections enjoyed by RTC did not run
with the notes in purchase and assumption transactions, the market for
such notes would be drastically reduced. Any reduction in the market
would negatively effect ... [the] RTC's ability to protect assets of
failed institutions159
152. See, eg., Firstsouth F.A. v. Aqua Constr., Inc., 858 F.2d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1988)
(no defense for breach of oral side agreement); FDIC v. First Nat'l Fin. Co., 587 F.2d
1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 1978) (oral agreement not to enforce promissory note held invalid);
FSLIC v. Musacchio, 695 F. Supp. 1044, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (oral side agreement
with corporation borrower to direct proceeds to individual does not excuse corporation
from repayment); FSLIC v. Sandor, 684 F. Supp. 403, 407 (D.V.I. 1988) (side agreement
that third party would assume obligation held invalid); State Say. & Loan Ass'n of Lub-
bock v. Kenney, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14286 (N.D. Cal., March 19, 1987) (oral side
agreement to forgive or assume note is invalid); FSLIC v. Flithers, 683 F. Supp. 552, 554
(E.D. La. 1987) (side agreement that note would not be collected held invalid); FDIC v.
MM & S Partners, 626 F. Supp. 681, 686 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (oral modification of agreement
is invalid against FDIC); FDIC v. Powers, 576 F. Supp. 1167, 1169 (N.D. 111. 1983),
aff'd 753 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir. 1984) (oral side agreement that guarantee forms would not
be enforced held invalid on § 1823(e)); FDIC v. Leach, 525 F. Supp. 1379, 1386 (E.D.
Mich. 1981), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 772 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1982) (oral side agree-
ment that note would not be collected and agreement of accord and satisfaction held
invalid); FDIC v. First Mortgage Investors, 485 F. Supp. 445, 454 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (oral
agreement concerning delay in repayment of note held invalid).
153. See Bryan v. Bartlett, 435 F.2d 28, 34-35 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915
(1970). (lack of consideration is no defense to personal liability of bank official for notes).
154. See FDIC v. Timbalier Towing Co., 497 F. Supp. 912, 922 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(note enforceable against borrower even though he never received full amount of note).
155. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(4), 103 Stat. at 370 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)). "The [RTC] shall have the same powers and rights... as the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has under sections 11, 12, and 13 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act [12 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1822, 1823]." Id.
156. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Colorado 126 Partnership, 746 F. Supp. 35, 37 (D.
Colo. 1990); Castleglen, Inc. v. Commonwealth Say. Ass'n, 728 F.Supp. 656, 672 (D.
Utah 1989).
157. See Vernon v. Resolution Trust Corp., 907 F.2d 1101, 1107 (11th Cir. 1990);
Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., 746 F. Supp. 419, 426-31 (D. N.J. 1990); Colorado 126
Partnership, 746 F. Supp. at 37; Castleglen, 728 F. Supp. at 670-01.
158. See FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47, 49-50 (8th Cir. 1989).
159. Adams, 746 F. Supp. at 431.
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The RTC may therefore be better able to find purchasers for these assets.
B. The RTC and the Venue Game: Now You See It, Now You Don't
Little noticed during formulation and debate, an obscure clause in
FIRREA is beginning to have a large impact on the litigation in which
the RTC is involved. Congress gave the RTC tremendous removal au-
thority with this provision, and its full impact is just now being felt.
Under FIRREA, the RTC is substituted as a party in any civil action
to which either the FSLIC or the institution for which the RTC is serv-
ing as conservator or receiver was party."6 If the suit arises out of the
actions of the RTC as conservator or receiver for an institution, the suit
can be removed to the U.S. district court for the district where the insti-
tution's principal place of business is located. 61 Additionally, the RTC
may "remove any such action.., from a State court to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia." 62 This provision has led to
what one district court judge has termed "legal gymnastics,"' 63 has
pointed out flaws in FIRREA's drafting, and has exasperated the D.C.
district judges.'4
The legislative history is silent as to what Congress intended by grant-
ing the RTC such broad removal and venue authority. 65 One argument
that the RTC advances is that Congress wanted the District Court in the
District of Columbia to gain special expertise in RTC and FIRREA liti-
gation.16 6 This "acquired-expertise" rationale might pertain to cases
which call for an application of FIRREA, but many, if not most of the
cases to which the RTC is party, involve state law issues. It is with these
cases that the "legal gymnastics" of the removal and venue game are
most apparent.
In Piekarski v. Home Owners Savings Bank, 67 a bank employee
brought a wrongful termination suit against his former employer, Home
Owners Savings Bank. 68 The suit was to be tried in a bifurcated liabil-
ity/damage trial in the District Court of Otter Tail County, Minne-
sota.169 Following phase one of the trial, in which all of the defendants
were found liable, Home Owners was declared insolvent and the RTC
was appointed as conservator. 70 Under the provisions of FIRREA, the
160. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501Q)(2), 103 Stat. at 389 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 144la(1)(2)).
161. Id. at § 501 (1)(3), 103 Stat. at 389-90 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1441ao)(3)).
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. Piekarski v. Home Owners Say. Bank, 743 F. Supp. 38, 44 (D.D.C. 1990) (Hogan
J.).
164. See infra notes 178-185 and accompanying text.
165. See FSLIC v. Westgate Partners, 726 F. Supp. 807, 809 (D. Colo. 1989).
166. See United Say. Bank v. Rose, 752 F. Supp. 506, 508 (D.D.C. 1990); Asbury v.
Germania Bank, 752 F. Supp. 503, 505 (D.D.C. 1990).
167. 743 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1990).
168. See Piekarski v. Home Owners Say. Bank, 743 F. Supp. 38, 39 (D.D.C. 1990).
169. See id at 40.
170. See id
1991] RTC S357
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
RTC was substituted as a party for Home Owners.'
The RTC attempted to remove the case to the United States District
Court in Minnesota, but was rebuffed by the federal district court
judge.'72 This ruling was apparently based on a previous decision that
held that if claims did not arise from any actions of the RTC, removal
may be made only to the District Court in D.C.'73 The RTC then re-
moved the case from the Otter Tail County Court to the Federal District
Court in D.C.'74
After its successful removal to the federal court, the RTC moved to
transfer the case to the District Court in Minnesota,1 75 the same court
that refused to hear the case on removal from the Otter Tall County
Court. The D.C. District Court granted the motion, ruling that pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfer was proper.176 "[W]hile th[e case] could
not be removed to the federal court in Minnesota from a state court, it
can be transferred there from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.... 177
Judge Thomas F. Hogan, who presided at the proceeding, "acknowl-
edge[d] that this is an exercise in legal gymnastics. However, the Court
can see no other way to act on the intent of Congress, both with regard to
FIRREA and the change of venue statute."' 178 Other cases involving the
RTC have followed a similar path from state court to the D.C. District
Court, and back to a federal district court in the state where the action
arose. 17 9 Another case appears to be headed in a similar path.' 80
171. See idl
172. See Piekarski v. Home Owners Say. Bank, 743 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D.D.C. 1990)
(citing Memorandum Opinion and Order, Piekarski v. Home Owners Savings Bank, Civ.
3-90-248, (D. Minn. 1990) (Devitt, J.) at 5).
173. FSLIC v. Westgate Partners, 726 F. Supp. 807, 809-10 (D. Colo. 1989).
174. Piekarski, 743 F. Supp. at 40.
175. See id. at 42.
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." Id. The D.C. District Court ruled that the
RTC was not barred from transferring the case back to U.S. District Court in Minnesota
after having it removed from a state court in Minnesota to the D.C. District court.
"Once the action has been removed to federal court, it should proceed as if it had been
brought in federal court originally." Piekarski, 743 F. Supp. at 42 (citing Wright, Miller
& Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3843 at 323).
177. Piekarski, 743 F. Supp. at 44.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., United Say. Bank v. Rose, 752 F. Supp. 506, 508 (D.D.C. 1990) ("case
involving Virginia parties, Virginia witnesses, Virginia facts, and Virginia law... [with]
virtually nothing to do with th[e D.C. District Court's] jurisdiction," removed by RTC
from state court in Virginia to D.C. District Court, then transferred to District Court in
Virginia); Asbury v. Germania Bank, 752 F. Supp. 503, 505 (D.D.C 1990) ("case involv-
ing Illinois parties, Illinois witnesses, Illinois facts, and Illinois law ... [with] virtually
nothing to do with th[e D.C. District Court's] jurisdiction," removed by the RTC from
state court in Illinois to D.C. District Court, then transferred to District Court in Illi-
nois); Belgiovine Enters. v. City Fed. Say. Bank, 748 F. Supp. 33, 36 (D.D.C. 1990)
(breach of contract/commercial tort action to be decided pursuant to New Jersey law
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The judges of the D.C. District Court have not been hesitant to criti-
cize the situation. As Judge Gerhard Gesell stated, "Congress could not
conceivably have envisioned that the trial judges [of the D.C. District]
would become expert in the laws of all 50 states and territories."",1 He
continued:
The only specialized knowledge developed to date has related to the
parsing of the removal provisions themselves, made more difficult by
the fact that [the] RTC does not speak with a single voice on this mat-
ter but delegates it to an array of private counsel who advance a range
of differing arguments against transfer and/or remand. 182
Judge Hogan said he "wonder[ed] whether Congress realized the extent
to which its broad language would force suits out of state court into the
federal courts."'" 3 He later directly commented that:
Congress would be wise to revisit the FIRREA removal provisions to
consider whether a federal forum is necessary in every case involving
[the] RTC (particularly those involving only issues of state law), and to
consider whether parties such as those in this case will be forced to first
remove to [the D.C. District Court], and then present a motion for
transfer to a forum more suited to complete the litigation.'84
In the meantime, the courts have been forced to apply the FIRREA re-
moval provisions literally. Parties to the litigation are compelled to en-
dure the cost of the procedural hopscotch. The situation leads to
"uncertainty and, ultimately, to a rather awkward and time-consuming
transfer pattern that does more justice to a Rube Goldberg cartoon than
to conventional notions of due process." 15
C. The RTC and State Banking Laws: A 400 Pound Gorilla
FIRREA gave the RTC the power to authorize emergency acquisi-
tions of failed or failing savings associations by other institutions.8 6 This
is the same power granted to the FDIC under Section 13(k) of the Fed-
removed to D.C. District Court, then transferred to District Court in New Jersey on
motion of plaintiffs);.
180. Hellon & Assocs. v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 755 F. Supp. 280 (D. Ariz. 1990).
The RTC simultaneously moved for removal and substitution of proper party. The court
granted the motion for substitution, but remanded the case back to state court. Because
the case did not arise from any action of the RTC, the only appropriate jurisdiction for
removal is the D.C. District. The court concluded by saying it had "reservations about
remanding a matter involving only state law issues that will probably be removed to the
District of Columbia, only to be transferred back to this Court after one of the parties
files a motion to transfer. Still, the Court sees no other way to interpret Congressional
intent with regard to FIRREA's removal provision." Id. at 284.
181. Asbury, 752 F. Supp. at 505.
182. Ma
183. Piekarski v. Home Owners Sav. Bank, 743 F. Supp. 38, 43 n.6 (D.D.C. 1990).
184. Id at 44.
185. Grafman, A New S&L Venue Game, Nat'l L. J., Jan. 14, 1991, at 13, 14.
186. See FIRREA, supra note 2, § 501(b)(4), 103 Stat. at 370 (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)).
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eral Deposit Insurance Act.1 87 Using its authorized power, the RTC
proposed a rule that permitted insured banks to retain and operate
branches of failed or failing thrifts despite state laws that prohibit such
activity.1 88 "[The] RTC believe[d] that such State laws present a serious
impediment to emergency acquisitions of troubled thrifts by banks and
increase the cost of resolution of these thrifts."'189
This RTC rule was upheld by the Eighth Circuit in Arkansas State
Bank Commissioner v. Resolution Trust Corporation.1 90 The court agreed
with the RTC's position that Section 501(b)(12)(A) of FIRREA granted
the RTC wide latitude in issuing rules and regulations. 91 The decision
of the Eighth Circuit "adds to the RTC's arsenal for enticing private
capital in its sale of thrift assets and suggests that future preemption by
the RTC of other state barriers - such as prohibitions against insurance
activities - will survive judicial review." 192
CONCLUSION
Congress prescribed a monumental task for the Resolution Trust Cor-
poration. Although managing the resolution and sale of failed savings
and loan institutions at the time of FIRREA's enactment was difficult,
the ever-increasing number of S&L failures makes the RTC's job even
more burdensome.
The RTC seems to have been given the proper authority and founda-
tion to perform successfully, but the complexity of the current situation
continues to test its capacity to perform effectively. To accomplish its
mission, the RTC must be flexible in its programs and operations, and
187. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(k) (1989).
188. See Retention of Thrift Branches Acquired by Banks in Emergency Acquisitions,
55 Fed. Reg. 13,543 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 1611) (proposed Apr. 11,
1990). "Under sections 13(k), the RTC may authorize such acquisitions notwithstanding
any provision of State law, upon making a determination that severe financial conditions
threaten the stability of savings associations and a determination that such authorization
would lessen the risk to the RTC." Id. at 13545 (emphasis added). Cf Malloy, Seeing the
Light: Savings Association Conversions and Federal Regulatory Realignment, 10 Ann.
Rev. Banking L. 189 (1991) (discussing forced conversions of failing savings associations
from state to federal charters).
189. Retention of Thrift Branches Acquired by Banks in Emergency Acquisitions, 55
Fed. Reg. 13,543 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 1611) (proposed Apr. 11, 1990).
190. 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
191. See id. at 162.
192. Leemon, RTC's Branching Victory Was a Boon for Taxpayers, Am. Banker, Oct.
10, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
The RTC is also considering testing its ability to supercede state rent-control and stabi-
lization laws. It recently seized a New York City condominium. Some of the units were
occupied by rent-controlled tenants who did not purchase their apartments at conversion.
The RTC threatened to have these tenants evicted in order to sell the units, despite New
York laws prohibiting such evictions. See In S. &L. Bailout, U.S. Is Moving to Evict 8
Rent-Regulated Tenants, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1990, at Bl, col. 2. The RTC withdrew
its eviction threat however, when the New York Attorney General stated that his office
would challenge the evictions in court. See S.&L. Crisis Muddies Market Outlook, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 18, 1990, § 10 (Real Estate), at 1, col. 2.
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critics will have to remain patient. The factors that brought about the
S&L crisis evolved over a decade of changing economic conditions and
shifting political tides. Sifting through the rubble of collapsed savings
institutions, salvaging their assets, and restoring confidence in the indus-
try will take the RTC some time.
Wayne M. Josel

